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COMES NOW the Appellant, JULIE ANN NEUSTADT, by and through her attorneys of
record, Scot M. Ludwig and Daniel A. Miller of Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson, LLP, and hereby
submits her Reply Brief.
Appellant (hereinafter Julie) will respond to the arguments Respondent (hereinafter Mark)
made in the order they appeared in his brief.
Contract Law
Mark argues the Julie is ignoring contract law. Julie is not ignoring contract law. She is
claiming that a specific provision in the contract should not be enforced due to public policy
considerations.
Habitual intemperance is not relevant to this Court's inquiry. The issue before the Court as
has been outlined by Julie in her appeal and briefing, and that issue is whether paragraph 4.8(b) of
the parties' prenuptial agreement is void because it violates public policy considerations. Worlton
v. Davis, 73 Idaho 217, 222 (1952). The decision of whether a contract is against public policy is

a question of law. Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 566 (1977). Habitual intemperance will not
assist the court in reaching its decision on the issue before. It is really difficult to ascertain what
Mark is even claiming with respect to his habitual intemperance argument, but in any event it has
nothing to do with this Court's analysis of the public policy issue.
Mark argues that Julie did not address Idaho Code §32-923 on appeal. That code section
identifies what a premarital contract may address. That code section also states that parties
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contemplating marriage may enter into a contract covering any "other matter, including their
personal rights and obligations, not in violation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal
penalty." LC. § 32-923(1), emphasis added. Julie has addressed this code section by arguing that
4.8(b) is void because it is against public policy.
Mark argues that Julie did not consider Idaho Code § 32-921 which is the definition section
ofldaho's premarital act. Julie is not claiming that the parties do not have an enforceable contract
that meets Idaho's requirements of a premarital agreement. Julie's claim is that one of the provisions
within that premarital agreement is not enforceable due to public policy considerations.
Much of Mark's argument is that Julie entered into this contract voluntarily and with
assistance of counsel and therefore, she should be bound by paragraph 4.8(b) of the contract. If
4.8(b) is not in violation of public policy considerations then Mark is correct. Julie will be bound
by the language of 4.8(b). But if this Court finds that 4.8(b) violates public policy that provision of
the contract cannot be enforced.
This Court stated many years ago that illegal contracts are void, and a void contract cannot
be enforced. Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 568 (1997). A party to an illegal contract cannot
ask the Court to have the illegal contract carried out. Id.
Mark's argument regarding divorce not severing death benefits to a named beneficiary is not
being argued by Julie. It is clear that Julie can name anyone she wants as a beneficiary to a life
insurance policy she has on her life. What Julie is arguing is that she does not want to be bound to
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name Mark as a beneficiary to a policy on her life when he has no insurable interest in her life post
divorce.
The cases cited by Mark are not applicable to this case. For example, Wheeler v. Ins. Co.,
101 U.S. 439 (1879) dealt with an insurance policy purchased to cover property owned by the debtor
to secure debt owed to creditors. Clements v. Terrell, 145 S.E. 78 (Ga. 1928) dealt with a deceased's
estate attempting to prevent the deceased's fiance from obtaining death benefits from an insurance
policy. The estate claimed she was not the fiance and the Georgia court held it did not matter if she
was or was not because she was the named beneficiary. The Georgia Court of Appeals in a later case
made it clear that its holding in Clements did not apply to wagering contracts, and that wagering
contracts were "void from its inception." Wilson v. Progressive Life Ins. Co., 7 S.E2d 44 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1940).

Secor v. Pioneer Foundry Co., 173 N.W.2d 780 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969) held that

termination of an insurable interest did not effect the right of the owner and beneficiary of a life
insurance policy. Bottom line is that Julie can raise this issue because she is seeking clarification
from this Court on an issue of first impression in this state.
In Idaho it is clear that Julie can insure her life and name anyone she wants to as beneficiary
whether there is an insurable interest or not. Julie is not contesting this statement of the law.
Julie will not recite the facts and holdings in the cases she has previously cited in her initial
brief namely Liss v. Liss, 937 So.2d 760 (Fl. Ct. App. 2006) andBrowningv. Browning, 621 S.E.2d
389 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) as Julie's initial brief fully covers the facts and holdings of both cases.
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Julie will reiterate that both of those cases involved contracts and contract law. The documents in

Liss, supra, and Browning, supra, both involved a property settlement agreements which are
contracts. Once merged into the decree the mechanism of enforcement is granted to the Court as the
contract is a court order. Browning, 621 S.E.2d 389, 394. The case cited by Mark, Sedell v. Sedell,
100 So.2d 639 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1958), stands for the proposition that settlement or separation
agreements merged into a decree of divorce are construed using contract principles. Sedell, 100
So.2d 639, 642. Therefore, the courts in Liss, supra and Browning, supra involved contract
principles. The case of Sedell, supra., did not involve public policy arguments involving lack of
insurable interests.
Mark argues that he gave up alimony in exchange for being named as a beneficiary of Julie's
life insurance policy. First, the language of the parties' prenuptial agreement does not support this
argument. Section 10.2 of the prenuptial agreement states: "Additional Consideration. By mutually
waiving and disclaiming any right to spousal support the parties will save substantial litigation cost
which might otherwise be involved in determining spousal support or any other payment, and each
party will be relieved from the real, but difficult to measure, costs of being away from their
individual work activities to participate in the litigation." Ex. A, § 10.2. There is no mention of
Mark being named beneficiary to a policy on Julie's life as part of the consideration for waiver of
spousal support. Again, the issue is whether what the parties' bargained for is enforceable because
of public policy considerations, not whether the parties' freely bargained for the provision. Julie has
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pointed out that even if the parties bargained for a provision in a contract, that contractual provision
cannot be enforced if it is against public policy. Worlton, supra; Quiring, supra.
Mark's argument regarding attorney fees is not supported legally.

Section 22 of the

Premarital Agreement provides for the award of fees and costs. Exhibit A, pg. 14, § 22. A basis for
the award of fees is if a contract provides for the award of fees. I.R.F .L.P. 908(A). Both parties
agree that the prenuptial agreement between Mark and Julie is a contract. Therefore, the Magistrate
Judge had the jurisdiction to award fees pursuant to section 22 of the parties' prenuptial agreement.
If Judge Scott's decision regarding the life insurance policy is affirmed, attorney fees should be
looked at again by the Magistrate Judge. If this Court reverses Judge Scott then the Magistrate
Judge's decision on fees should be reinstated.
In conclusion, Julie asks this Court to hold that the provision of parties' prenuptial
agreement, 4.8(b) is unenforceable as void against public policy as it is a wagering provision, and
that Judge Scott's decision on this issue and attorney fees be reversed. In addition, Julie requests that
this Court award Julie her fees and costs as the prevailing party pursuant to section 22 of the parties'
prenuptial agreement.

DATED This

1,. f-rt;;afFebruary, 2020.
LUDWIG ♦
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